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Notes
SENTENCING: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE
ENLIGHTENED*
Airt going back to Whitesburg.
Won't make it Christmas Day.
Got caught by a Campton sheriff,
And now I gotta pay.
Ole Mitch bought Harl Black's life
With good time on hard labor.
But I'm here for ninety-nine years
For spitting on old Judge Tabor.
Old Mountain Folklore
He who the sword of heaven will bear,
Should be as holy as severe.
Shakespeare
Measure for Measure, Act 3, Scene ii
I. INTODUCrION
In June, 1968 the Kentucky Crime Commission, in keeping with
legislative instruction, made certain recommendations for a change
in Kentucky's current treatment of crime and punishment.1 Within its
report was a suggestion that sentencing in all non-capital criminal
cases be rendered by the judge instead of the jury.2 Thus, it must be
emphasized that this discussion is confined only to sentencing in non-
capital cases.
The authors have arrived at a definite recommendation which is of-
fered at the conclusion of the paper. It is our opinion that the sug-
* The authors wish to recognize, and express their appreciation for, the
assistance which we have received in compiling the needed material for this
Note. Professor Robert Lawson of the University of Kentucky College of Law has
rendered invaluable assistance as an active advisor in our work on the subject
of sentencing. A special thanks is extended to the circuit judges throughout Ken-
tucky who responded graciously to our written questionnaires on the subject.
Their efforts have contributed an immeasurable amount of substance to our study.
Mr. Glenn Wade, Chairman of the Parole Board and Mrs. Lucille Roebuck, an
associate member, supplied us with information particularly relevant to the
functions of the Parole Board, and their informative remarks were most helpful.
Lastly in noting only, Mr. Sture Westerberg, former Commissioner of Cor-
rections and Mr. Harold Black, Deputy Commissioner, are commended for their
interest and assistance with the correctional questions involved in this Note.1 KErucxy CRmm ComnvnssioN, OuTLnzE FOR Psoposan CmmnvAL LAw
REmION (June 28, 1968).2 Id. § 3410.
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gestion outlined is not only the most efficient and proper but also the
most feasible under our present sentencing apparatus. Although we
have utilized the results of our research and interviews to support our
preference, it is important to emphasize that another purpose of this
writing was to expose the various available alternatives.
It would be most difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess and
criticize the rationale and practical effect of the Crime Commission
recommendation, relying entirely upon academic recordings. The
writings of legal thinkers provide little basis for a realistic approach to
a practical discussion of what needs to be done to the sentencing pro-
cedure in Kentucky. Consequently, while the authors of this article
have given sufficient adherence to the scholastic writing on the subject,
we have also taken a practical look at the sentencing structure of Ken-
tucky. We have searched out answers to pressing questions on the sub-
ject from members of the judiciary, corrections department, and
members of the parole board. Thus, while it may be said by more
prominent craftsmen than ourselves that such information received
has been unskillfully used, we submit the proposition that at least our
scope has not been impaired by insufficient preparation.
H. P1mrosoPRY OF SMxrqCINc
We strive not to achieve uniform sentencing, but to acquire a uniform
philosophy which includes the ingredients that lead to a sentence... in
keeping with enlightened social and legal policy.3
In order to intelligently deal with the question of who should
determine the sentence of an offender, it is relevant to first consider
the objectives to be attained by sentencing. It may be that the end
sought to be accomplished will preclude certain persons or groups of
persons from being able to fairly render a sentence.
The first topic to be discussed in this paper, therefore, will be the
current philosophies of sentencing. It would be futile to present as
established a single sentencing philosophy: "... . there are as many
philosophies [of sentencing] as there are sentencing judges [and
individual jury members], and the personal factor in sentencing makes
for a myriad of variation. . . ."4 To proceed intelligently, however,
some "majority view" of sentencing philosophy must be established,
remembering that such would be only a majority view of todays
writers, and not a uniform view accepted by all.
3 Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. EV.
499 (1966).4 Parsons, Aids in Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 424 (1966).
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At the risk of being arbitrary and subjective, the goals of modem
punishment and sentencing may generally be categorized under four
headings: (1) deterrence; (2) neutralization; (3) rehabilitation; and
(4) retribution.
Deterence "simply refers to the prospect of pain as a psychological
stimulus hoisted by society in anticipation of the response of absten-
tion from gaining illicit pleasure."5 This is one of the most widely
accepted purposes of organized punishment. By punishment one offend-
er, society demonstrates that all others will similarly suffer for a breach
of the law. Deterrence is usually broken down into two subdivisions:
(1) special deterrence, aimed at the specific offender and based upon
the assumption that the inflicted punishment will deter the particular
offender who has received the punishment from repeating the pro-
scribed act; (2) general deterrence, aimed at the populace and based
upon the assumption that the threat of punishment will provide a
stimulus for the general public to abstain from the commission of the
act.
Since deterrence is aimed at two different classes (i.e., [1] those
who have already committed the proscribed act, and [2] those who
have not yet committed, but may be tempted in the future to commit,
the proscribed act), the severity of the punishment necessary to effect
deterrence must be determined by weighing the competing demands of
both classes, (i.e., [1] general deterrence; [2] special deterrence).
With regard to special deterrence, there must be at least enough
force brought to bear so as to prevent repetition by the particular
offender. This is the minimum amount of force necessary to effect any
deterrence: How strong must the stimulus be to prevent others from
indulging in the proscribed conduct? Obviously the upper limits con-
tain variables (i.e., who are "others"? how many are included in
"others"?) which are necessarily beyond the scope of this paper. These
upper and lower limits of severity are presented only to demonstrate
the complexity of sentencing for deterrence. Somewhere between this
upper and lower limit, the sentence must be set by weighing the
competing demands. As will be shown later, the problem is more
complicated when the other aims of sentencing are added.
A second goal of punishment is neutralization. This "relies on the
idea that restraint has an incapacitating effect."6 When one who
perpetrates a crime against society is removed therefrom, there can
be no repetition of the criminal act by the offender until he is re-
5 Mueller, Punishment, Correction, and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58, 74
(1966).
6Id.
[Vol. 57,
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admitted into society. "Naturally the principle of utility would dictate
that solely as far as neutralization is concerned, no more force should
be employed than is necessary for preventive purpose. That means also
that restraint should last no longer than the danger emanating from
the restrained persons persists."7
The third aim of punishment is rehabilitation. This is based on the
theory that a punishment period can also be a period of treatment,
and that one who has committed an unlawful act should receive con-
ditioning to prevent a reoccurrence of the violation. Under this goal a
convicted criminal should theoretically be detained for the length of
time necessary to condition him against the future commission of
crime.
A fourth goal or, more properly, justification for punishment, is
retribution. Although the concept of retribution has been denounced
as Archaic and irrational, this concept is far from dead. In fact, at
least one writer has concluded that "retribution has shown a remark-
able recovery from a once disadvantaged position."8 It has been argued
that this concept may be sustained on logical grounds, that punishment
is necessary to demonstrate that a wrong is a wrong rather than a right.
"Retribution, then, is the most significant instrument for forming a
conscience, for teaching right from wrong, for forming a super-ego."9
The foregoing are generally considered to be the goals of "en-
lightened" sentencing philosophy. Because the concept of retribution
is at best controversial, it is assumed in this paper that the majority
view is expressed in the first three concepts: (1) deterrence; (2)
neutrialization; (3) rehabilitation. These should be the goals of
sentencing. Obviously, these concepts are interrelated and, more im-
portantly, involve a weighing process. One cannot punish a single
offender so severely as to generally deter the public-at-large. Rather,
one must weigh the necessity of general deterrence against the other
aims of sentencing.
As stated before, this discussion of philosophy becomes relevant
when one attempts to assign the duty of sentencing to a person or a
group of persons. Thus the question to be determined in this paper
becomes, who is most qualified to effect the above explicated goals,
while providing maximum protection for the rights of the individual
offender.
7id.
8 Gerber & McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey of Philosophy and the
Law, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 529 (1967).
9 Mueller, The Many Dimensions of Punishment as a Social Tool, 1961 (Un-
published manuscript).
1969] NoTs
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III. TBm ALTEENAIVEs:
TBrE BAD, THE GOOD, THE EN GnrTmim
A. Introduction
For the purposes of this paper, discussion will be limited to the
three major types of sentencing procedures used today in the United
States. The first cf these is that which is used in Kentucky today-
sentencing by the jury. The second is what may be called a majority
procedure-sentencing by the judge. The third procedure is called
indeterminate sentencing. In this latter method sentence is not de-
termined by either a judge or a jury. Rather, the convicted felon is
committed for a term, the limits of which are set by statute; the length
of his incarceration in a penal institution is then set wtihin these
limits by a parole board or an adult authority. These alternatives will
be discussed in detail later.
By way of definition, it should be noted that "sentencing" for the
purposes of this paper may be divided into two stages. The first stage
is the initial determination of the length of sentence, and the second,
the redetermination of the sentence; i.e., the function of the parole
board at present. Thus the question to be discussed by this paper is
not only who should make the initial determination of length of
confinement, but also who should determine when, within the
prescribed limits, a prisoner should be readmitted to society.
B. Jury Sentencing: The Bad?
Kentucky uses a sentencing procedure which a minority of juris-
dictions employ.' 0 In this state the initial determination of sentence
length is made by the jury, the same jury that heard the evidence
against the offender. This, however, is the procedure only where the
defendant has entered a plea of not guilty and has had a trial by
jury. Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, the judge
assesses the penalty. The above is made explicit by the Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provide:
(1) When the jury returns a verdict of guilty it shall fix the degree of
the offense and the penalty, except where the penalty is fixed by law,
in which case it shall be fixed by the court.
(2) Where the defendant enters a plea of guilty, the court may fix the
penalty except in cases involving offenses punishable by death."i
10 See note 66 infra.
11 KE:NrucKy RuLms oF CnmmmnA PnocEnmE [hereinafter cited at Ky. R.
Cmm. P.] 11.02(l), (2) (1962).
[Vol. 57,
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Although the jury has the duty of assessing the punishment of the
offender, it should be noted that the judge has the statutory power to
probate the convicted offender:
(1) A Circuit Court, subject to the provisions and conditions pro-
vided in KRS 439.250 to 439.560, may postpone the entering of a
judgment and the imposing of sentence and place the defendant on
probation. This order shall only be made on motion of such de-
fendant.12
This power of the judge to probate is delimited by Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes § 489.270 [hereinafter referred to as KRS] as follows:
The period of probation shall be fixed by the court and at any time
may be extended or shortened by the court by order duly entered. Such
period, with any extensions theieof, shall not exceed five years, except
in cases in which the defendant is charged with failure to support his
dependents. Upon completion of the probationary period, the defendant
shall be deemed finally discharged, provided no warrant issued by the
court is pending against him, and probation has not been revoked.13
It should be noted that the court has continuing jurisdiction over the
offender and that irrespective of the length of the sentence levied
by the jury, the period of probation fixed by the court may not exceed
five years.'4
Upon granting probation, the court has the power to impose
conditions by which the probated offender must abide. The language
of the Statute makes it clear that the court has wide discretion as to
the conditions imposed.15 The court has the power at any time to re-
voke the probation for violation of any of the imposed conditions. If the
12Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 439.260(1) (1962).
13 KRS § 439.270 (1956).
14 61 Ky. Op. A-r'y GEN. 618 (1961).
15 KRS § 439.280 (1956) provides as follows:
By order duly entered the court may impose and at any time may
modify conditions of probation. The court shall cause a .copy of such
order to be delivered to the probation officer and the probationer. It may
impose as a condition, that the probation shall do any of the following
or any other:
1. Avoid injurious or vicious habits;
2. Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character;
3. Report to the probation officer as directed;
4. Permit the probation officer to visit him at his home or elsewhere;
5. Work faithfully at suitable employment as far as possible;
6. Remain within a specified area;
7. Pay such an amount of money into the court imposing the conditions
as directed by that court;
8. Make reparations or restitution, in an amount to be determined by the
court, to an aggrieved party for damage or loss caused by his offense;
9. Support his dependents.
19691
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probation is revoked, the judge may reinstate the original sentence,
or may impose a new sentence within the limits prescribed by law.16
If the convicted defendant is not probated, the sentencing process
is then turned over to the Parole Board when he is incarcerated in a
penal institution. In Kentucky the responsibility for determining when
a prisoner is eligible for parole is left solely to the discretion of the
Parole Board.17 Prior to the Special Session of the Kentucky Gen-
eral Assembly in 1963, the minimum amount of time which an inmate
was required to serve before becoming eligible for parole was set by
statute.'8 This was changed by KRS § 439.340(3) which gives the
Parole Board the responsibility for determining when an inmate is
eligible for parole.19 The Parole Board now has absolute discretion in
establishing its own regulations for determining eligibility for a parole
hearing.
The Parole Board has responded to its statutory mandate by enact-
ing administrative regulation DC-Rg-6, which sets up a schedule for
parole eligibility. The regulation states that each prisoner "shall have
his case reviewed in accordance with the schedule. . . " The schedule
is based upon a scale whereby one serving a sentence of a given
number of years will be eligible for a parole hearing after serving a
given number of months and/or years of the sentence.20 It should be
emphasized that although there is a schedule for parole eligibility, the
Board has retained its discretionary power by enacting section 8 which
states as follows:
In keeping with intent of the act [KRS 489.340(8)], the Parole
Board may, with the consent of the majority of the board present, review
the case of any inmate for parole consideration prior to his eligibility date
if it appears advisable to do so.21
16 KRS § 439.300 (1) (1956) provides as follows:
At any time during probation the court may issue a warrant for the
violation of any of the conditions of probation and cause the probationer
to be arrested. . . . Thereupon, or upon arrest by warrant as herein
provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and
may continue or revoke the probation, and may cause the sentence im-
posed to be executed, or may impose any sentence which might have
een imposed at the time of the probation.
17 KRS § 439.340 (3) (1963) provides as follows:
The board shall adopt such rules or regulations as it may deem
proper or necessary with respect to the eligibility of prisoners for parole,
the conduct of parole hearings, or conditions to be imposed upon parolees.
Regulations governing the eligibility of prisoners for parole shall be in
accordance with prevailing ideas of corrections and reform.
18 KRS § 439.115-.45 (repealed 1962).
19KRS § 439.340(3) (1963).20 
KNTucKY PAROLE BOARD REGULATION [hereinafter cited as Ky. PAuoLE
BD. BEG.] DC-Rg-6 (1966).
21 Ky. PAnoi BD. REG. DC-Rg.
[Vol. 57,
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When an inmate becomes eligible for a parole hearing, the second
stage of the sentencing procedure is begun. This is the determination
by the Parole Board of whether to grant parole. When an inmate ap-
pears before the Parole Board there are three possible dispositions
which may be effected:
(1) The board recommends parole with whatever stipulations it deems
necessary in order to aid his adjustment in the community.
(2) Parole is denied and the inmate is required to serve the remainder
of his sentence.
(3) His case is deferred until a given date in the future when it will
again be reviewed. Deferments are given when the majority of the
board feels the inmate is not a good risk for parole at this time, but
due to the length of his sentence does not feel he should have to
serve the remainder of it without further review. Cases are also de-
ferred for short periods of time when additional information is
needed, such as psychiatric evaluations, medical reports and new
reports on community attitudes before a decision can be made.22
In determining the proper disposition of the parole applicant, the
Parole Board has certain information which it considers. KRS § 439.340
provides for the source of their information:
As soon as practical after his admission and at such intervals there-
after as it may determine, the division of correction shall obtain all
pertinent information regarding each prisoner, except those not eligible
for parole. Such information shall include his criminal record, his conduct,
employment and attitude in prison, and the reports of such physical and
mental examinations as have been made. The division of probation and
parole shall furnish the circumstances of his offense and his previous
social history to the institution and the board. The division of corrections
shall prepare a report on such information as it obtains. It shall be the
duty of the division of probation and parole to supplement this report
with such material as the board may request and submit such report to
the board.
2 3
Section (2) of this act provides that in granting or denying parole
"the board shall consider the pertinent information regarding the
prisoner and shall have him appear before it for interview and
hearing."2
4
The Annual Report of the Parole Board for the Year Ending July
1, 1968, states the procedure followed by the board and the factors
considered at a parole hearing:
Prior to the meeting, each board member reviews all available data
concerning the inmate including his social history, story of the crime,
previous record, attitudes of the residents and officials of his home com-
22 1968 Ky. PAROLE BD. ANN. REP. 3-4.
23KRS § 439.340(1) (1963).24 KRS § 439.340(2) (1963).
1969] NOTES
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munity, and all psychiatric and psychological data available. Upon
arrival at the place of incarceration, the board members review the in-
mates institutional record which contains a record of his prison adjust-
ment, work assignments, school reports, etc. The third and final step in
the pArole review process is an interview with the inmate. This is con-
ducted in an informal manner with the inmates being given an oppor-
tunity to say anything he feels would be helpful to his case, and the
parole board members asking questions which they feel pertinent, such
as his plans if he is recommended for parole, where he will work, etc.
No time limit is set for his individual interview and as much time is
allowed for an interview as necessary. Upon completion of the inter-
view, the inmate leaves the room and his case is discussed and voted
upon.
2 5
From interviews with members of the Parole Board conducted by
the authors, the following was surmised with regard to parole pro-
cedure in Kentucky.2 6 The reports presented to the Board are at least
adequate with regard to the prisoner's background, prison record, and
social history. However, with regard to psychological and psychiatric
reports, information available is sorely lacking. In an October 18, 1968,
interview, Mr. Glenn Wade, Chairman of the Parole Board, and Mrs.
Lucille Robuck, a member of the Parole Board, revealed that cur-
rently neither Eddyville nor LaGrange state prisons has a fulltime
psychologist or psychiatrist. Mr. Wade stated that most of the men who
have been convicted of crimes of a non-violent nature have no psy-
chological test before appearing before the Board. Mr. Wade further
stated, however, that when an inmate has been convicted for a crime
of violence, standard practice of the Parole Board is to require a report
from a psychologist before the prisoner is released. This psychological
data is obtained by individual contracts with non-resident psycho-
logists. Psychiatric reports on prisoners are nearly non-existent.
27
In connection with the foregoing description of parole procedure,
it should be emphasized that, under present jury sentencing, the only
limit placed upon the Parole Board is the maximum amount of time
during which a man may remain incarcerated. This is the only effect
which a jury sentence has. The release time is otherwise at the sole
discretion of the Parole Board.
C. Judge Sentencing: The Good?
A second alternative sentencing procedure, which is the majority
procedure, is sentencing by the trial judge after guilt determination by
25 1968 Ky. PAnoLE BD. ANN. REP. 8.
2 6 Administrative policy prohibited the writers from examining any of the
individual records of inmates. The adequacy of these reports was endorsed by
Mr. Glenn Wade, Chairman of the Parole Board.
27 See APPENDix (Interview with Wade).
[Vol. 57,
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a jury.28 The procedure followed is generally the same as that used in
Kentucky, the distinction being that the jury determines only guilt or
innocence and the trial judge assesses the penalty.
Although the procedure here is basically the same as that of Ken-
tucky, a brief look at how it operates may be beneficial. To demonstrate
this, we have chosen to describe the procedure used in the federal
system.
When one convicted of a crime stands before a federal judge to be
sentenced, the judge has two alternative dispositions.29 The first
alternative disposition is pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 8651. This section
provides that with respect to any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, the judge may probate the defendant where the
judge is "satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interests of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby .... 
The judge may, in the alternative, assess a penalty against the con-
victed defendant. It is here that the sentencing judge performs the
function which the jury presently exercises in Kentucky. Like the jury
in Kentucky, if the federal judge determines that punishment is re-
quired, he must determine within statutory limits how much of the
maximum sentence to impose. However, the sentencing judge in a
federal court has a power not possessed by the sentencing jury in
Kentucky. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a), the judge may control the
convictee's right to be paroled. By this provision the court may
designate a "minimum term, at the expiration of which the prisoner
shall become eligible for parole, which term may not be more than
one-third the maximum sentence imposed by the court."31 In lieu of
28 See note 66 infra.2 9 There is a third possible disposition which can be made under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4208(b) (1958):
If the court desires more detailed information as a basis for determin-
ing the sentence to be imposed, the court may commit the defendant to
the custody of the Attorney General, which commitment shall be deemed
to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by law for a
study as described in subsection (c) hereof [subsection (c) provides that
the report "may include but shall not be limited to data regarding the
prisoner's previous delinquency or criminal experience pertinent cir-
cumstances of his social background, his capabilities, hii mental and
physical health, and such other factors as may be considered pertinent].
The results of such study together with any recommendations which the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons believes would be helpful in determ-
ining the disposition of the case, shall be furnished to the court....
After receiving such reports and recommendations, the court may in its
discretion: (1) Place the prisoner on probation as authorized by section
8651 of this title, or (2) affirm the sentence of imprisonment orinally
imposed, or reduce the sentence of imprisonment, and commit the ot-
fender under any applicable provision of law.
80 18 U.S.C. § 8651 (1948).
8118 U.S.C. § 4208 (1958).
1969] NOTES
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this, the court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment and
specify that the Parole Board determine the parole.
3 2
Another difference between the sentencing procedure used in Ken-
tucky and that employed in the federal courts is the use of a pre-
sentence report in the federal courts. To better understand exactly
what a presentence report is, it will be beneficial to quote at some
length from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 82 (c), which provides
for the presentence report:
(1) The probation service of the Court shall make a presentence in-
vestigation and report to the Court before imposition of sentence or
granting of probation unless the court otherwise directs.
(2) The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior
criminal record of the defendant and such information about his
characteristics, his financial condition and circumstances affecting
his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or granting
probation or in correctional treatment of the defendant, and such
other information as may be requried by the Court. The Court,
before imposing sentence, may disclose to the defendant or his
counsel all or part of the material contained in the report of the
presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to defendant
and his counsel to comment thereon
33
It is obvious that the presentence report is to contain information
which will aid the court in determining an appropriate sentence. At
the First Philadolphia Judicial Sentencing Institute, Mr. John Wallace,
Chief Probation Officer, of Probation for the Courts of New York City,
outlined the elements of the presentence report as follows:
When viewing the investigative process, you will find that the pro-
bation officer will be exploring such areas as family history, marital
history, education, employment, military service, religion, social activities,
economic status, health, prior record, and any other areas which appear
significant. These areas of the defendant's life history will be explored in
order to gain some understanding of who the defendant is now and how
that defendant came to be what he is.34
32 Id.
3 3 FED. R. Cmm. P. 32(c) (1) and (2) states:
1. The probation service of the court shall make a pre-sentence in-
vestigation and report to the court before imposition of sentence or grow-
ing of probatin unless the court otherwise directs....
2. The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any
prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his
characteristics, his financial condition and circumstances affecting his be-
havior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or granting probation or
in correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information
as may be required by the court. The court before imposing sentence
may dsclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material
contained in the report of the presentence investigation and afford an
opportunity to defendant and his counsel to comment thereon. Any ma-
terial disclosed to the defendant and his counsel shall also be dis-
closed to the attorney for the government.
34 Wallace, Aids in Sentencing, 40 F.R.D. 433-34 (1965).
[Vol. 57,
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It is obvious that the objective of this report is to present facts
defining the history and character of the convicted defendant.35 The
utility of this information cannot be over-emphasized, especially in
light of the fact that it is often the only source of information, other
than the trial proceedings, used by the sentencing judge.2 6
At least two federal district courts (the Eastern District of
Michigan and the Eastern District of New York) have deviated from
the procedure followed in the other federal districts. This deviation in-
volves the use of a multi-judge sentencing panel. The procedure fol-
lowered here is that after the defendant has been convicted, and ap-
proximately one week before the judges meet to discuss the various
cases, each judge in the district is furnished with a presentence report.
The panel of judges then convenes and discusses the various recom-
mendations. The value of this system is that it "rescues the sentencing
judge from the moral solitude to which he is condemned under the
system. He is afforded the opportunity to put his opinion to the acid
test of honest forthright discussion ... and rational appraisal of two
equals whose opinion he can hardly ignore .. -7
At what may be called the second stage of the sentencing pro-
cedure-the granting or denying of parole-there are only minor
deviations between the Kentucky procedure and the parole procedure
used at the federal level. The relevant federal parole statutes are found
in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4208. One significant difference which should be
explicated, that is found in 18 U.S.C. § 4202, states that one may be
paroled only "after serving one-third of such term ... or after serving
fifteen years of a life sentence or of a sentence of over forty-five years.38
This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. §
35 Although this presentence report is of great value in sentencing, and al-
though it is ofen the only sentencing aid used by the federal judge, its use is
not mandatory. Neither the defendant nor the prosecution has the right to demand
the use of such a report. Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d 9 (10th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Schvenke, 221 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1955).
36 Notwithstanding the fact that the presentence report is the primary source
of information utilized by the sentencing judge, there are other available sources
of information. James Benton Parson Judge, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio recognized the availability of the following sources of
information, emphasizing that the desirability of using some of the following
is controversial:
a. Transcript of preliminary hearing on sentence.
b. The prosecution's file ....
c. Formal written statements in aggravation or mitigation....
d. Form reports of investigative agency on the type of crimes involved
(not the particular crime at issue nor the party or parties involved
in it), relative to its current prevalence, its increase or decrease during
the prior period, and its relationship to other types of crime. ...
e. The presentence report. ...
Parsons, Aids In Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 423, 426-27 (1964).
37 Id. at 432.
38 18 U.S.C. § 4204 (1948).
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4208 (a) which allows a judge to set the minimum amount of time
which a prisoner must serve before he is eligible for parole.39 It ap-
pears that the judge may commit the defendant with no mention as to
parole eligibility. In such a case the inmate would be eligible for
parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4202 at the expiration of one-third of his
sentence. In the alternative, the judge may, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4208(a), set the prisoner's time for parole eligibility at less than one-
third of the sentence imposed.
Since this is the only major statutory deviation from the parole
provisions of Kentucky, a further explication is not necessary. For the
language of the federal parole statute, reference should be made to
the footnotes.40
39 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) provides as follows:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction the Court having jurisdic-
tion to impose sentence when in its opinion the ends of justice and best
interests of the public require that the defendant be sentenced to im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year, may (1) designate in the sen-
tence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of
which the prisoner shall become eligible for parole, which term may be
less than, but shall not be more than one-third of the maximum sentence
of imprisonment to be served in which event the court may specify that
the prisoner may become eligible for parole at such time as the board of
parole may determine.
40 The Federal parole provisions are as follows:
A federal prisoner, other than a juvenile delinquent or committed
youth offender, wherever confined and serving a definite term or terms
of over one hundred and eighty days whose record shows that he has ob-
served the rules of the institution in which he has been in confinement,
may be released on parole after serving fifteen years of life sentence of
over forty-five years. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1948).
If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper
institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for release
on parole that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will
remain at liberty without violating the law, and if in the opinion of the
Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the
Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on
parole.
Such parolee shall be allowed in the discretion of the Board to re-
turn to his home or to go elsewhere, upon such term and condition,
including personal reports from such paroled person as the Board shall
prescribe, and to remain, while on parole, in the legal custody and under
the control of the Attorney General, until the expiration of the maxi-
mum term or terms for which he was sentenced.
Each order of parole shall fix the limits of the parolee's residence
which may be changed in the discretion of the Board. 18 U.S.C. § 4203
(1948).
A warrant for the retaking of a United States Prisoner who has
violated his parole may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a mem-
ber thereof and within the maximum term or terms for which he was
sentenced. The unexpired term of imprisonment of any such prisoner
shall begin to run from the date he is returned to the custody of the At-
torney General under said warrant, and the time the prisoner was on
parole shall not diminish the time he was setnenced to serve. 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205 (1948).
A prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole,
(Continued on next page)
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D. Indeterminate Sentencing: The Enlightened?
Indeterminate sentencing is a third alternative sentencing proce-
dure used in some states. Under this procedure, neither the judge nor
the jury determines the length of confinement. The function of the
jury is to determine only guilt or innocence. The judge then merely
commits the defendant to a parole board or adult authority which
determines, within the limits prescribed by law, the sentence to be im-
posed upon the convicted defendant. This adult authority also
functions as a parole board. To better understand how this procedure
operates, consider the following a description of this procedure as used
in California.
When the jury in California has found a defendant guilty of a
felony, the jury has completed its duty. At this point the judge must
make the initial determination to either probate the convicted felon, or
to have him committed to a correctional institution. In order to make
this determination, the California Penal Code provides that a hearing
be held by the judge to determine whether or not to grant probation.
The statute provides that "at the time or times fixed by the Court, the
Court must hear and determine such application [for probation], if
one has been made... ." 41
As in the federal courts, the judge has the aid of a presentence
report to aid in his determination of whether or not to grant probation
to the convicted felon. The California Penal Code provides as follows:
in every felony case in which the defendant is eligible for pro-
bation . . . the court must immediately refer the matter to the pro-
bation officer to investigate and to report to the court . . . upon the
circumstances surrounding the crime and concerning the defendant and
his prior record, which may be taken into consideration either in ag-
gravation or mitigation of punishment.
42
It is apparent that this provision is similar in its scope to Federal
Rule 32(c), which also provides for a presentence report.45 As in the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
shall be given an opportunity to appear before the Board, a member
thereof, or an examiner designated by the Board.
The Board may then, or at any time in its discretion, revoke the
order of parole and terminate such parole or modify the terms and con-
ditions thereof.
If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so termin-
ated, the said prisoner may be required to serve all or any part of the
remainder of the term for which he was sentenced. 18 U.S.C. § 4207
(1948).
41 CAL. PRENAL CoDE § 1203 (West 1956).
42 Id.43 See note 31 supra.
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federal presentence report, the emphasis of this report is on the
history and character of the defendant.
44
There is a major difference between the procedure at the probation
hearing in California and the sentencing hearing in the federal court.
In the California proceeding the defendant has the right to see the
presentence report and to attempt to refute it.45 The California Penal
Code states that the presentence ".... report... must be made available
to the court and the prosecuting and defense attorneys at least two
days prior to the time fixed by the court for the hearing...... This
provision gives the defendant and his attorney an opportunity to
examine the report and, hopefully, time to defend and disprove any
false statements in it.47 This protection afforded the defendant at a
probation hearing is enhanced by another section of the California
Penal Code.
The circumstances [presented in aggravation or mitigation] must be
presented by the te3timony of witnesses examined in open court, except
that where a witness is so sick or infirm as to be unable to attend, his
deposition may be taken by a magistrate of the county out of court... 48
It is obvious that this provision affords the defendant at the probation
hearing the opportunty to call his own witnesses. "A defendant has the
right to present evidence in mitigation of his punishment or to assist
the court in the determination of defendant's application for proba-
tion."49
As previously mentioned, the defendant in the federal courts has
no right to see or attempt to refute the contents of the presentence
report.50 It is difficult to rationalize the use of the presentence report,
absent such protection for the defendant.51 The protection afforded by
44 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1956) provides as follows:
If probation is not denied and in every felony case in which the
defendant is eligible for probation, before any judgement is pronounced
and whether or not application for probation has been made, the court
must immediately refer the matter to the probation offcer to investigate
and to report to the court, at a specified time, upon the circumstances
surrounding the crime and concerning the defendant and his prior
record, which may be taken into consideration either in aggravation
or mitigation of punishment.
45 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1956).
46Id.
47
1n People v. Valdivia, 5 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1969), the Court stated, "had the
defendant thought the report insufficient or inadequate he could have presented
witnesses to counteract or correct any portion of the report." Id. at 834.
48 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1956).49 People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 872,-, 161 P.2d 623, 629 (Cal. 1945).
50 Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d 9 (10th Cir. 1961); United States v.
Schwenke, 221 F.2d 865 (2nd Cir. 1955).51 In J. WIGMORE, Tim ANGOLE-AMERiCAN SYsTmu oF EVIDENCE IN TBIALS AT
CoMMnvoN LAw § 1397 (3d ed. 1940), the author stated:
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 57,
HeinOnline  -- 57 Ky. L.J. 470 1968-1969
such procedure would seem to outweigh any inconvenience.
If the California judge determines "that the ends of justice would
be served by granting probation to the defendant, the Court shall
have the power in its discretion to place the defendant on probation."
52
If the judge decides in favor of probation, he also has the power to
determine the period of probation.
If the judge decides that a period of confinement is required, he
must conform to California Penal Code § 1168. This is California's in-
determinate sentence statute and it provides as follows:
Every person convicted of a public offense for which imprisonment
in any reformatory or state prison is prescribed by law shall [unless pro-
bated, granted a new trial or granted a suspended sentence] . . . be
sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison, but the court imposing
sentence shall not fix the term or duration of the period of im-
prisonment. 53
This judgment of the court consists only of a recital of the offense with
a designation of the prison to which he is to be committed, and is the
end of the judicial proceedings. From this point, any decision as to the
prisoner's future is an administrative one to be made by the Adult
Authority.54 The convicted defendant is committed for the maximum
time allowed under the statute. Thus if the convictee has been con-
victed of a crime which carries a penalty of up to fifteen years, he is
said to be confined to prison for fifteen years. The judge must commit
him for the maximum period allowed. Any decision to lessen the
penalty must be made by the Adult Authority.
The California Adult Authority is a board of six members appointed
by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.5 5 The func-
tion of the Adult Authority can best be illustrated by considering
Section 8020 of the California Penal Code.
In the case of all persons heretofore or hereafter sentenced under the
provisions of Section 1168 of this Code, the Adult Authority may de-
termine and redetermine, after the actual commencement of imprison-
ment, what length of time, if any, such person shall be imprisoned .... 56
It is apparent that the function of initial determination of sentence
length is vested in the Adult Authority. However, this is not the sole
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human state-
ments is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination... has found
increasing strength in lengthening expenence.
52 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1956).
53 Id. at § 1203.1.
54 Id. at § 1168.
r5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075 (West 1956).
GG Id. at § 3020.
1969] NoTEs
HeinOnline  -- 57 Ky. L.J. 471 1968-1969
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
function of the Adult Authority. It also functions as a parole board.
This is provided by California statute which states that "the granting
and revocation of parole and the fixing of sentences shall be determined
by the Adult Authority... .,57 Thus, once the judge has committed the
defendant to a correctional institution, the Adult Authority has the
sole control-within the limits fixed by statute-of his future.
It should be emphasized that the Adult Authority is not a judicial
body. The judicial proceedings have terminated at the point when the
judge commits the convicted defendant to the correctional institution.
The appearance before the Adult Authority is an "administrative
proceeding" to determine what sentence, within the limits prescribed
by law, the defendant should be required to serve.5 8 Because it is an
administrative proceeding, the California court has held that it does
not deprive the court of the right to make a final determination of the
rights of defendant 0 and it does not confer judicial power on the
Adult Authority. 0
The standard for due process has also changed from that which
must be observed at the trial stage. The California court has held that
since the determination by the Adult Authority of the sentence length
is not a judicial act,61 the prisoner has no constitutional rights to
notice, a hearing, or counsel in the proceedings of the Adult
Authority. 62 This administrative body can, therefore, determine the
length of the prisoner's sentence without his presence, and without
affording him an opportunity to introduce any evidence or testimony in
mitigation.
63
It should be noted that California has at its disposal a diagnostic
center in which prisoners can receive psychological and psychiatric
evaluation. This should be compared to Kentucky where no such center
is available and where there is only limited psychological and
psychiatric information available.6
57 Id. at § 5077. This section provides that "the granting and revocation of
parole and the fixing of sentences shall be delivered by the Adult Authority.
58 People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020 (1958).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See p. 19 supra.
6 People v. Ray, 5 Cal. Rptr. 113, 115, cert. denied 366 U.S. 937 (1961).
63In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 357 P.2d 1080 (Cal 1960), the court stated:
No statute requires that the Adult Authority in exercising its juris-
diction to determine and redetermine sentences shall give the prisoner
notice or a bearing.... The Penal Code specifically grants to the Adult
Authority power 'to suspend, cancel or revoke any parole without notice.'
(Pen. Code § 3060) The provisions for determining or redetermining
sentence and for granting, suspending, or revoking parole do not violate
due process because of the absence of a requirement for notice or hearing.
Id. at 1085.64 See APPENDix (Interview with Wade).
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IV. CRnciss OF SENTENCING PROCEDUS
A. Jury Sentencing: Blind Retribution
Kentucky is one of only thirteen states which provide for jury
sentencing in non-capital cases. 5 This small minority of states still
adhering to the priority of jury sentencing can turn to some impressive
arguments for support.66 For instance, it has been contended that a
jury which does not have the power to determine the sentence will
acquit a defendant whom it believes to be guilty, fearing that the
judge will impose an unreasonably harsh penalty.6 7 This proposition
has substantial factual support. Numerous judges and attorneys in
Virginia have stated that juries consistently acquit persons who are
obviously guilty of drunken driving because the mandatory penalty for
such misconduct is forfeiture of the offender's license for one year-a
reprimand considered too severe by most jurors. 68 It is interesting to
point out, however, that circuit judges in Kentucky overwhelmingly
reject this idea. Out of thirty-five judges being polled, twenty-eight
responded that if the right to sentence were taken from the jury, this
would not result in fewer convictions.69 In fact four circuit jurists
opined that such transfer of sentencing power would result in more
convictions, and only three agreed with the above Virginia Practi-
tioners.70
Another argument in favor of jury sentencing arises out of the
anonymity of jurors. The method of random selection of jurors and the
6 5 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 318, 322, 336, 395, 415, 424, (1959); Alt. STAT.
ANN. § 43-2306 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2502 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT.
§9-1819 (1956); Ky. R. Cmm. P. 9.84 (1966); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2359, 2361,
(Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.410 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 94-7411 (1949); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-05 (1960); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22 § 926 (1958); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-2707 (1955); TEx. CODE ClaM. PROC.
ART. 37.07 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 88.19, 19.1-291, 292 (1960).
Ky. CONST. § 7 states that "the ancient mode of trial by jury should be held
sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as
may be authorized by this constitution." The Texas constitution has a similar
provision and the highest court in that state has held that the right of jury trial is
the same right which existed at common law and that there was no suchright at
common law to have the jury determine the punishment. Ex Pane Marshall, 161
S.W. 112 (Tex. 1913).
66 There is historical support for jury sentencing. At common law, penalties
were levied by the court in all cases; jury sentencing in this country is claimed
to be a reaction to the harsh penalties imposed by English judges in the colonies
and the early distrust of governmental power. The practice was encouraged by
the lack of substantial difference in training and competence or intelligence be-
tween colonial judges and juries. Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons
to Prison, 60 COL. L. REv. 1134 (1960); NATIONAL Coim.srr=E ON LAW O-
sERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CumIrNAL PoCEDmURE 23-28 (1931).6 7 Comment, Quotient Verdicts By Jury Sentencing, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 995
(1967).
68 Id.; McQuown, Reformation of the Jury Sentence, 6 Ky. L. J. 182 (1918).
69 See APPENnIX (Questionnaire to Circuit judges).
70 Id.
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brief tenure of service makes them less susceptible to the pressures of
public feelings and opinions than the elected judge who, as in Ken-
tucky, must seek favor at the next election.71 One cannot deny, how-
ever, that the jury may be influenced by extrinsic pressure in small
communities.
It has also been argued that the judgment of the jury may be more
enlightened than that of the judge because, unlike the judge, its mem-
bers do no become calloused by continuous exposure to criminal
cases.72 Circuit judges of Kentucky generally disagree with this as-
sumption. Nineteen out of thirty-five polled by the authors insist that
if they were allowed to sentence they would not impose a harsher
sentence than the juries usually do.
73
Perhaps the most basic and persuavise support given to jury
sentencing is the traditional "two heads are better than one" argument.
Even though judges and members of professional sentencing boards
are academically equipped for the responsibility of sentencing, a
jury "levels" the individual opinions of the defendant's peers and pro-
vides a compromise of varied temperaments. Therefore, advocates of
jury sentencing proclaim that a jury is more likely to assess a fair
punishment.74 Only a panel of laymen, it is asserted, can push aside
idealistic and theoretical data to reach a realistic determination of the
punishment which, from case to case and over the long run, will
prove to be the most personalized and most effective.
The weight of authority both in practice and theory is clearly
against sentencing by jury.75 The main objection to jury sentencing is
that it often results in the imposition of sentences, without the benefit
of needed information concerning defendant's background, by jurors
not appropriately trained. Since the average juror sits on only one or
two cases in a period of two or three years, he has little opportunity to
utilize expertise gained through judicial experience. It is well known
that professional persons, and those most educated, are usually either
71 See Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 369, 370 (1956).
72Id.
73 See APPENDIX (Questionnaire to circuit judges).
74 See Betts, supra note 71. It is important to point out that the polling of
circuit judges by the authors produced an interesing composite of ideas in regard to
the comparison between jury and judge sentencing. The majority of the judges
polled thought that there would be no difference between the two methods of
sentencing with reference to consideration given a defendant's social or racial
background. Also, while most judges approved of jury sentencing, they also ac-
cepted favorably the idea of sentencing by the court, thus indicating that, in their
opinion, it does not make a great deal of difference who renders the penalty.
See APPENDIX (Questionnaire to circuit judges).
75 See Betts, supra note 72; Comment. Consideration of Punishment By Juries,
17 U. Cm. L. REV. 400 (1950); Note, Should the Jury Fix the Punishment For
Crime?, 24 VA. L. Rxv. 462 (1938).
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exempted from, or tend to avoid, jury duty.7 6 Although the jury can
gain some insight into the character of the defendant during the course
of the trial, this information does not serve as an adequate substitute
for a presentence report, since the rules of evidence often prohibit
introduction of information relevant to sentencing.77 It has been sug-
gested that even if the jury had access to information concerning the
background, character, and past record of the accused, there is doubt
that a jury of ordinary laymen would have the requisite knowledge
and experience to interpret the material presented and to determine
the proper punishment.
78
A similar criticism of jury sentencing is that a lay jury is "re-
tribution oriented." Stated another way, the jury, in assessing a penalty
does not give adequate consideration to the accepted goals of
sentencing outlined in the second section of this article. Rather, retri-
bution is given too much weight. One finds it difficult to imagine a
jury, even if they had a presentence report, properly weighing the
needs for deterrence, neutralization, and rehabilitation.
Another volley fired by legal scholars at the jury sentencing ap-
paratus is the contention that such practice creates significant disparity
in sentences. This inconsistency is attributed to the belief that each
penalty imposed by a jury is the rc3ult of the momentary whims and
emotions of its members influenced by such irrelevant matters as the
appearance, demeanor and personality of the lawyers or of some of
the witnesses for or against the defendant.79 It is reasonable to assume
that racial and ethnic factors enter into jury deliberation. However,
circuit judges in Kentucky deny that defendants are prejudiced because
76 See Hurt, Determination of the Penalty-By Judge or Jury?, 1 TEx. L. &
LEG. 124, 180 (1947).
77 C. McCouncK, EVIDENCE § 158 at 334 (1954).
In those jurisdictions in which it is the jury's duty to determine the
punishment, it would seem that they should be allowed to consider the
effect of the parole laws, for punishment cannot be intelligently imposed
without full knowledge of the actual amount of time that the defendant
will remain incarcerated. Comment, Consideration of Punishment By
juries, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 400, 406 (1950).78 See Hurt, supra note 77.
79 Fisher, A Proposal For A Penal Code With Procedure to Be Governed By
Rules of Court, 39 ILL. L. REv. 111 (1944). Three cases in Texas tried in the
District Criminal Court of Dallas County give an excellent example of the illogical
results reached by the jury in some instances regarding the assessment of penal-
ties. All three defendants in these cases were indicted for the same rane and rob-
bery. Severance was granted and the first to be tried was found guilty and sen-
tenced to death. The second to be tried was scntenced to life imprisonment and
the third upon being found guilty was given a five year suspended sentence. All
three juries agreed as to guilt but imposed entirety different penalties. While it is
not contended that all three sentences should have been the same in type and
duration, the diversification does give an indication of the possible incongruities
inherent in jury sentencing. Hurt, supra note 76, at 132.
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of race.80 It is only logical that a certain amount of disparity will exist
between sentences rendered by juries. However, such a disparity in
penalties rendered may well be a desirable aspect of sentencing proce-
dures since it achieves to some extent, the desired flexibility needed for
individualized treatment of each defendant. Also, there is little reason
to think that incongruity in penalties would be less prevalent if
sentences were imposed by the court.
Jury sentencing invites compromise within the jury room of a con-
viction for a light sentence.81 There is no way to ascertain precisely
the extent of jury compromising except by interviewing jurors and
even then there is a reluctance on their part to disclose such informa-
tion. Nevertheless, "quotient" verdicts do exist with jury sentencing,82
and such a practice seriously impugns the competency of sentencing.83
And finally, many claim that with a jury, the personal attachment to
each case is lost. It is pointed out that a jury panel is an impersonal
congregation. If a miscarriage of justice or a gross wrong results from
it's deliberations, there is no individual upon whom censure can be
cast.84
B. Judge Sentencing: A Lack of Uniformity
The American Bar Association has strongly recommended that
sentencing be rendered by the judge in all criminal cases. 5 This is
the procedure followed by most of the states and is supported by most
writings on the subject.86 Actually, judge sentencing was the traditional
method of rendering criminal penalties prior to the American coloniza-
tion. Immediately after the Revolutionary War there was a natural
reaction to the conduct of colonial judges appointed by representatives
of the Crown.87 This fear of a dictatorial judgeship, along with the
fifth amendment, encouraged the implementation of jury sentencing.
The return of judge sentencing upon the American judicial scene is due
almost entirely to the growing skepticism of the jury procedure. While
80 See APPENDix (Questionnaire to circuit judges).81 See generally PRESIDE r'S COMM N ON LAW ENFORcE ENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIMM IN A FREE Socry (1967).
82 See Comment, supra note 67, at 968.8 3 Most Kentucky circuit judges expressed the opinion that quotient verdicts
are used very little, if at all. Many thought however, that such a practice is
prevalent in jury sentencing. While this is difficult for a judge to determine, it
would seem that the use of such a compromising device is probable. See APPENDix
(Questionnaire to circuit judges).84 Kerr, A Needed Reform In Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky. L.J. 107, 108 (1918).8 5 AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CMI-
INAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING, ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Dec. 1967).
86 1 R. MORELAND, MODERN CRIiINAL PROCEDURE 289 (1959).8 T Note, Should the Jury Fix the Punishment for Crime?, 24 VA. L. REv. 462,
463 (1938).
[Vol. 57,
HeinOnline  -- 57 Ky. L.J. 476 1968-1969
Noixs
the defects of jury sentencing have been discussed previously, it is
important to point out why many believe that the judge is not affected
by the same impairing factors. It is also important to explain why some
of the arguments in favor of judge sentencing are subject to question.
While the jury may lack the proper information needed for the
determination of effective sentencing, the judge is believed to have a
keener insight into the needs of each individual defendant. A judge sits
from term to term, hears the testimony in every case that comes before
him, and knows the value and weight of the testimony that is offered.
It is contended that because of his experience and training the judge
may more properly determine from the witnesses the credence to
which they are entitled and is in a much better position to impose just
and fair punishment than is the jury.88 Here it must be noted with a
certain amount of vexation that some of the arguments in favor of both
jury and judge sentencing are circuitous and confusing. For instance,
one writer claims that because of the transient nature of the jury, its
members associate themselves with the real problems of sentencing
and do not become calloused.89 However, an argument in favor of
judge sentencing uses the same reasoning by proclaiming that the
judge is more sensitive to peculiar nature of each case since he has
gained more experience by confronting recurrent problems over a long
period of time.90
There is no doubt that a judge has access to more information rele-
vant to sentencing. Kentucky judges being interviewed stated that in
sentencing they would consider such things as family life, previous
record of defendant, economic condition of defendant, and chance for
rehabilitation.9 1 All of these factors are inadmissable at the trial for
jury consideration.99 Judges saddled with the duty of sentencing would
probably rely on professional assistance in their decisions. More than
half of the Kentucky circuit judges polled, replied that they would
desire a presentence report from a board of psychiatrists and psycho-
logists. 9 3 Thus, it can be concluded that the most persuasive argument
88 See Kerr, supra note 84.
89 See Betts, supra note 71 at 370.00 See Kerr, supra note 84 at 108.
91 See APPENDIX (Questionnaire to circuit judges).
92 C. McComsicK EVIDENCE § 158 at 334 (1954).
93 See APPE;Noix (Questionnaire to circuit judges). Some of the judges polled
qualified their answers by preferring such a report only I instances where thedefendant suffers from mental illness. The main objection to a presentencing report
from a board of psychiatrists and psychologists in the field of crime and punish-
ment is the mistrust of doctors by judges. Some judges asserted that such reports
are far too idealistic and impracticeal.
Interestingly enough, the converse of a presentence report to the judge has
been suggested by one writer. This would be a post-sentencing report by the judge
(Continued on next page)
HeinOnline  -- 57 Ky. L.J. 477 1968-1969
KENTucKy LAw JouRa[o
in favor of judge sentencing stems from the tremendous advantage a
judge normally has over the jury in regard to the accumulation of in-
formation needed for rendering the proper punishment. Despite the
magnitude of the added responsibility, a substantial majority of the
Kentucky circuit judges polled approved of sentencing by the court.94
While many proponents of judge sentencing support their argu-
ments by referring to the defects in jury sentencing, there is a reckless
disregard of fact in this line of argument. For example, it is alleged that
the jury considerations as to penalty is incited by the emotions and
prejudices of its members.95 But judges are no less human and do not
have the benefit of the reconciliatory influence that is wielded by a
collective panel. Some judges regard sex offenses as the worst;
others feel that the most henious crimes are committed with guns.
There are judges who favor the prosecution and there are judges who
favor the defendant. There are judges who are severe and judges who
are lenient. There are judges who rely heavily on presentence reports
and there are others who give the reports only the most casual read-
ing.96 Men who have either pleaded guilty or have been determined
such by judicial proceeding may march past the bench at the rate of
forty or fifty a day, during which time the judge will levy penalties
based on hunch, or influenced by his mood at the moment.97 It is im-
possible for the judge, just as it is for the jury, to disengage himself
from his own personality. Consequently, if there is disparity in jury
sentencing, it no doubt exists equally, at least, with sentencing by the
court.98 Clearly there is evidence of the human factor lurking within the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
and the submission of sentencing decisions to judicial review. If thisprocedure were
adopted, both trial and appellate judges would be forced to put forth in writing
the reasons for imposing punishment in a given case. Nowhere in the United States
is such a method used. Frankel, The Sentencing Morass and a Suggestion for
Reform, 3 Cnnv. L. BULL. 365, 370 (1967).
94 See APPENDix (Questionnaire to circuit judges).
95 See generally Fisher, A Proposal for a Penal Code-With Procedure to be
Governed by Rules of Court, 39 ILL. L. REv. 111 (1944).
9 6 GUIDE For SENTENCINO, NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASsoCIATAoN,
NEw Yons CITY (1957).97 Breecher & Breecher, Why Judges Cart Sleep, SAT. EvE. PosT, Jly 13,
1957, at 96.
The magistrates handling as they do in the year's gristmill a similar
class of cases, it had been almost taken for granted that ascending to the
judge's bench clothed each magistrate with the wisdom of Solomon and
dignified his rulings with the oracular wisdom of justice himself and had
entirely freed him from any personal bias or eccentricity. Everson, The
Human Element in justice, 10 J. CGuM. L. C. 90, 93 (1919).98 "When 202 judges hand out sentences as widely variant as their personali-
ties, maybe it is not difficult to see why there is unrest among prisoners and a
feeling among the law-abiding members of society that justice is not the even
goddess that she is symbolized." Address by Mayor Frank I. Hanscom, member
of the Board of Parole of New York reprinted in the United States Daily, June
(Continued on next page)
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unique discretion of each individual judge just as it does in each jury
panel. An example of this judicial variable is the U.S. District Courts,
where judges render penalties in each case. For instance, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana imposed terms of im-
prisonment averaging 46.9 months in 1956 as compared with terms
averaging 8.6 months for a U.S. District Court in Vermont 9 In 1948,
the Northern District of California sentenced its average narcotics of-
fender to 41.5 months while the Southern District of California averag-
ed 18.1 months.100 In 1965, conviction for a Dyer Act violation in the
Eastern District of North Carolina drew an average sentence of 43
months while in the Middle Distrtct of North Carolina the sentence for
the same offense averaged 21 months. 10' Thus, it is evident that dis-
parity in judge sentencing is just as prevalent as in jury sentencing. It
is only proper to submit, however, that it is extremely difficult to de-
termine whether such disparity is undesirable. While discrepancies may
exist at the expense of fairness, it may be that a certain amount of dis-
parity is not only unavoidable but appropriate for individualized sen-
tencing. 0
2
The reason that disparity of length in sentencing is often appro-
priate in punishment for similar crimes can best be demonstrated by
repeating an earlier quotation: "We strive not to achieve uniform
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
4, 1932 quoting from 23 J. CRIm. L. C. 509 (1932). See also Gaudet, The
Differences Between Judges in the Granting of Sentences of Probation, 19 TEMP.
L.Q. 471.(1946).
But there is some support for the proposition that if judge sentencing were
adopted, state-side uniformity in sentencing could be advanced by periodic meet-
ings of judges throughout the state. At such meetings prioblems of sentencing could
be discussed. Such 'sentencing institutes" are in existence in many states as well
as in the federal system. Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968,
982 (1967).
99 See Breecher & Breecher supra note 97.
100 Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards, U. PENN. L. REv. 257(1952.).
101 See Frankel, supra note 93, at 367.
10 2 But there is strong disagreement on this point. Even today, disparity is
largely the product of judicial inconsistencies and not, as some suggest, the product
of individualization. At a federal workshop of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Judicial Circuits, a set of identical presentence reports of five convicts were dis-
tributed to groups of judges, who were then asked to pronounce sentence. Three
judges hypotheically fined an income ta evader, 23 judges released him on pro-
bation, and 23 imprisoned the same man for times ranging from one to five years.
Forty-seven released a Dyer Act violator on probation, six committed him under the
Youth Correction Act. For a bank robber, 28 recommended indeterminate sen-
tences under 4208(A) (2) for maximum periods ranging from five to 20 years
and three recommended probation ith psychiatric care. For a forger, 34 opted
for straight sentences ranging from one to ten years, 14 for commitment under
4208(A) (2) for terms ranging from three to ten years. Seven would have levied
straight sentences ranging from two to five years, two split sentences, and nine
indeterminate commitments under 4208(A)(2) ranging from two to five years.
Frankel supra note 93, at 869.
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sentences, but to acquire a uniform philosophy which includes the in-
gredients that lead to a sentence... in keeping with enlightened social
and legal policy." 03 The uniform philosophy which was earlier ex-
plicated includes deterrence, neutralization and rehabilitation. These
are the goals of sentencing. It is obvious that it will take longer to
rehabilitate some than others. The same can be said of the other two
goals. This disparity per se is not bad. However, it would seem that
the average sentences discussed above reflect either a disparity in
judgment or in philosophy. Both of these are unfair.
Finally, as mentioned previously, the judge is susceptible to poli-
tical pressures of the most severe variety. Even if the man who has
donned the robes of public justice can stand aloof from the influence
of a constituency, he may become an overseer in an ivory tower, keenly
attuned to the needs of the convicted person, but unknowingly
detached from the interests of the society of which his voters are a
part.
C. Indeterminate Sentencing: Experience, Expertise and Information
Indeterminate sentencing has also been the subject of extensive
comment by scholars. The use of the Adult Authority has generally
been accepted by scholars as a giant step forward in the search for
enlightened sentencing. Typical of the response of scholars is that of
Judge Theodore Levin:
It is my opinion that the most practical remedy for eliminating the
faults of our present sentencing practices lies in the creation of a
sentencing board composed of individuals who, by reason of their
education and demonstrated experience are able properly to analyze the
elements of criminal conduct and evaluate the prescribed treatment.104
It should be noted that although approval of indeterminate sentencing
is probably a majority view among scholars today, there are writers
who have presented valid criticism of indeterminate sentencing.
The principal criticism of Adult Authority type indeterminate
sentencing lies in the possibility of incompetency of its members.10 5
Obviously one of the chief factors which would contribute to com-
petency is adequate salaries for the board. In order to get competent
individuals to serve on a sentencing board, there must be adequate
compensation. Only in this manner is it possible to obtain members
with a background closely related to corrections. Absent salaries
adequate to attract competent personnel, the members "may lack the
10 3 See text at note 3 supra.
1
04 Levin, Aids in Sentencing, 13 FED. fROB. 3, 5 (1949).
105 George, Sentencing Methods and Techniques in the United States, 26
FED. PROB. 33, 35 (1962).
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judgment necessary to make wise decisions or the character to resist
pressures from prosecutors or influential politicians who demand
favorable action with respect to their clients."10 6
Another valid criticism is that there is at least some increased
danger of an abuse of the rights of the individual offender. As pre-
viously mentioned the California Court has determined that the initial
determination of sentence length by an Adult Authority is not a
judicial proceeding.10 7 Rather, it is an administrative proceeding in
which the prisoner has no constitutional right to notice, a hearing, or
counsel in the proceedings of an Adult Authority.1
0 8
Beyond this it is suggested that there is also protection afforded the
individual who is sentenced by a judge or jury merely by the more
direct pressure exerted by the community on the judge or jury.
Although it is recognized that this pressure may at times be detrimental
to enlightened sentencing, it is added protection for the defendant.
This protection would seem to be lessened by the use of indeterminate
sentencing. It could be argued that the fate of the prisoner may be
lost in the automony of the Adult Authority, as well as the anonymity
of the defendant after his commitment to an institution.
One of the main advantages of indeterminate sentencing advanced
by its proponents is the information which can be gathered by the
time the convicted person is brought before the Adult Authority.
Even if there is a presentence report which can be utilized by a
sentencing judge or jury, the use of an Adult Authority or sentencing
board has the added advantage of having time to properly reflect
upon the report as well as obtain any additional background informa-
tion needed. This indeterminate sentencing procedure would avoid the
hurried consideration given by the judge who is "under heavy time
pressure in disposing of the cases crowding his docket."1 9 This added
time becomes especially important where there is available a profes-
sional staff to gather relevant background and psychological data." 0
Another advantage of a sentencing board is also listed as an ad-
vantage for jury sentencing. This is the requirement that several must
agree on the disposition of a case."' Thus the fate of an inmate is not
subject to the whim of a single individual. This is some added pro-
tection for the defendant.
106 Hayner, Sentencing by an Administrative Board, 23 LAw & CormMp.
nOB. 476, 493-94 (1958).
'o7 See People v. Leiva, 285 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1953).
108 Id. at 46.
109 George, supra note 105.
1o Hayner, supra note 106.
11 George, supra note 105.
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A third advantage of a sentencing board making the initial determin-
ation of the duration of the sentence is that it would enhance the
possibility of a uniform philosophy of sentencing. Obtaining sentences
which conform to enlightened sentencing philosophy (as explicated in
the second section of this paper) is always a difficult matter. But to
think that any uniformity can be obtained when the duty of sentencing
is placed in the hands of fifty different sentencing judges or juries is
absurd. Each person has his own ideas as to what should be considered
in imposing a sentence. Only if this sentencing function is effected by
one group, such as a professional sentencing board, can there be hope
for uniformity of philosophy. An earlier quotation appropriately states
the objective of sentencing reform: "We strive not to achieve uniform
sentencing, but to acquire a uniform philosophy which includes the
ingredients that lead to a sentence . . . in keeping with enlightened
social and legal policy.""
2
All the foregoing advantages are contingent upon obtaining
qualified members to serve on the sentencing board. Without quality
on the board, its advantages disappear. However, the potential quality
of the board which may be obtained is the chief advantage of a pro-
fessional sentencing board. A judge or jury normally is not trained in
the area of corrections psychology. It would be impossible to de-
mand such training of either. It would not be impossible to demand
such qualification for members of a sentencing board. Thus the pos-
sibility of an improved quality of sentencing would be a great ad-
vantage of a professional sentencing board, if the potential were
realized.
V. RECOMVMNDATION
Kentucky should adopt indeterminate sentencing with the present
Parole Board functioning as the sentencing board. Although this pro-
posal appears at first blush to be a radical departure from the jury
sentencing procedure now used in Kentucky, a closer look will show
that it will not involve such a radical change.
Under the present jury sentencing procedure, the only function of
the jury is to set the maximum amount of time, within the statutory
limits, which a convicted defendant can serve. The minimum amount
of time which one must serve before he is eligible for parole is left
solely to the discretion of the Parole Board.113 Although the Board has
enacted a regulation that sets the minimum amount of time which must
112 Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L.
R -v. 499 (1966).
1"3KRS § 439.340(3) (1963).
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be served before being eligible for a parole hearing,114 the regulation
specifically allows the Board to hear any petition for parole if it is
so agreed by a majority. Thus to turn over sentencing to the Parole
Board would only give them the additional right to set the maximum
amount of time, within statutory limits, which one could serve.
It is submitted that members of the Parole Board are in a better
position to determine the maximum sentence required for a convictee.
Under the present system the jury assesses the upper limits of a
sentence with only the information which it has obtained by the trial
proceedings. There is no presentence report available. Thus the jury
has little opportunity to impose a penalty which conforms to the
present philosophy of sentencing. Even if the sentencing duty were
turned over to a judge, the absence of a presentence report would
severely limit the propriety of the sentence.
The Kentucky Crime Commission has stated that the present
mechanical framework cannot support a presentence report because it
would overload the system. The same was stated by Mr. Sture Wester-
berg, Commissioner of Corrections-that without additions to the staff
of parole and probation officers in Kentucky, there can be no pre-
sentence report. 1 5 This is not the case with the Parole Board. Not only
does the Parole Board have the facilities and personnel to conduct a
presentence report, but it is presently conducting investigations of a
similar nature which guides its decisions in granting or denying
parole."n The same information relevant to the granting of parole
would be relevant in making the initial determination of the maximum
length of the sentence. It would be but a small extra burden on the
Board to set the maximum length of time to be served. It seems un-
desirable not to utilize to the maximum the information collected by
the Kentucky Department of Corrections. It is extremely unwise for
either judge or jury to attempt to levy a penalty without such in-
formation.
Another advantage of indeterminate sentencing is that sufficient
time becomes available to observe the convicted defendant, and also
sufficient time to properly investigate the history of the defendant and
gather psychological data. This is an advantage, even if there is a
presentence report, and no matter who-judge or jury-assesses the
penalty.
In addition to the previous advantages mentioned, allowing the
Parole Board to set the upper limits will increase the flexibility of
114 Ky. PAROLE BD. REG. DC-Rg-6 (1966).
"15 See Appendix (Interview With Westerberg and Black).
116 KRS § 439.340 (1963).
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sentencing. To allow the Parole Board to set the maximum sentence
would eliminate the problem of forcing the Parole Board to release a
prisoner whose maximum period of detention was set by a jury at
less than the statutory maximum. At the present time 50% of the
prisoners are released because they serve out their sentence.-'7 Also,
at the present time only about 13% of the prisoners now serving
sentence for committing crimes against property were sentenced for
the maximum amount of time allowed by statute."18 Thus it is ap-
parent that a sizeable percentage of the men who are returned to
society are returned to society, not because the Parole Board believes
that they are ready to assume their responsibilities as citizens. Rather,
they are returned because they have served a period of time which was
fixed by a jury with no presentence report, a jury which fixed the
amount of time to be served at less than the statutory maximum.
A jury, totally uninformed as to the background and character of
the defendant, should not have the power to bind a Parole Board
which has at its disposal adequate information for making a proper
decision as to sentence length. To do so is to frustrate, at least in some
cases, the goals of corrections; i.e., rehabilitation, deterrence, and
neutralization. The maximum length should be determined (within
statutory limits) by a well informed body possessing a certain degree
of expertise. In Kentucky, the Parole Board seems to best meet that
criteria.
A final reason for turning over the sentencing to the Parole Board
is to insure that there is more unanimity in sentencing philosphy and
judgment. As previously stated there is a wide disparity in sentences
assessed by different judges." 9 But more importantly, such gross dis-
parity is injurious to the objective of a consistent sentencing philos-
ophy. It is submitted that a professional parole board would more
closely conform to the modem sentencing philosophy.
Although the above recommendation has been made considering
the present framework in Kentucky, it is not an indorsement of the
present system. First of all, the parole board members are underpaid.
Under the provisions of KRS 439.320(2), the salary of the Board
members is $10,000. The chairman's salary is $10,500. KRS § 439.320 (1)
directs the Governor to appoint to the Board only persons "who have
demonstrated their knowledge and experience in correctional treatment
or crime prevention and members shall be appointed without reeard
to their political affiliation." It is unwise to rely upon such a small
117 See APPNmix (Corrections Information).
'Is Id.
19 See pages 478-79 supra for data on sentencing disparity.
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salary to attract the high calibre board member demanded by statute.
High quality does not come at a low price.
A second necessary improvement is to increase the accessibility to
psychological and psychiatric data. It is appalling that there is no
resident psychologist or pschiatrist at any Kentucky correctional insti-
tution. As previously stated, the only data available is obtained by
independent contracts with psychologists. Psychological data is avail-
able only when relating to those vho are guilty of crimes of violence.
There is hardly any psychiatric data available for inmates in general,
no matter what their needs or how heinous the crime they have com-
mitted.
To properly gather such information, it is imperative that Kentucky
establish some type of diagnostic center to which selected inmates-at
least-can be confined for presentence examination. The cost of such
a center would be great,120 but, it is a cost which is necessary. It seems
that the legislature has for too long turned its back on the cost of send-
ing a repeater back through the complete arrest, trial, and re-com-
mittment procedure. Also forgotten seems to be the "cost in human
livs and property damage caused by those released without proper at-
tention. In essence, while the recommendations made by this article
can help set up a working sentencing apparatus, more efficient and
effective than the one we now have, in the long run its success will
depend entirely upon the General Assembly. For it is this representa-
tive body that in the last analysis must decide whether the loss of
voting franchise due to unacceptable acts makes a human being any
less deserving of just treatment.
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr.
Bill Cunningham
12 0 See Apl mix (Interview With Westerberg and Black).
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APPENDIX
I. QUEsTONNAmE TO KENTUCKY Cmcurr JUDGES
There were 85 responses to the 67 questionnaires sent to circuit
judges. The comments from them were outstanding. It would not be
feasible to list them all. Stated henceforth, however, is a excerpt from
the written response of Hon. John A. Breslin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
of the 19th District, which is indicative of the forethought and per-
ception exhibited in the replies:
We are dealing with courts, felonies, and punishment-not medical
admissions. The English have long said that certainty of punishment is
more of a deterrent to crime than severe penalties, and I have found
this so. England today is following the Sociological pattern, and the
crime rate is soaring. We must not lose sight of our function as a court-
primarily to protect the community and to punish those who violate the
laws of the land and then if possible, to correct the criminal. Failue to
uphold the law as declared by the Legislature, and the reluctance to
require its adherence (order) is a failure to be just, anarchists to the
contrary.
A. Sentencing by jury
1. Do you approve of sentencing by jury: Yes 13; No 11
2. What factors do you believe the jury takes into consideration in
determining the measure of punishment?
(26) appearance of defendant;
(14) appearance, ability, and personality of defendant's at-
torney;
(19) character of defendant;
(28) brutality of the crime;
(1) the race or color of the defendant;
Others: Political influence; established families;
personal experience with defendant.
8. To what extent do you believe the jury uses quotient sentencing
in criminal cases? Extensively 9; Minimal 12; No opinion 2.
4. In your opinion, ff the right to sentence were taken from the
jury and placed under the control of a judge, would this result
in fewer convictions, because the jury, not knowing what
punishment the judge would fix, would in many instances find
a verdict of not guilty? Yes 3; No 28; More convictions 4.
5. Is it your opinion that Negroes are given greater sentences than
are whites for the same crime? Yes 2; No 26; Lesser sentences 3.
[Vol. 57,
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B. Sentencing by judge
1. Would you approve of sentencing by judge? Yes 22; No 12.
2. What factors as a judge would you consider in determining the
measure of punishment?
a. Family life
b. Flagrant violation of the law
c. Habits of defendant
d. Previous record
e. Age
f. Economic conditions of defendant
g. Chance for rehabilitation
8. Would you as a judge rendering sentence desire the submission
of a pre-sentence report from a board of psychiatrists and
psychologists relating to the character of defendant? Yes 17;
No 12
4. Do you think a judge would be more or less prejudiced in re-
gard to racial or social background of defendant than the jury?
More 5; Less 12; No difference 16.
5. If you were allowed to sentence, would you impose a harsher
penalty on defendants than juries normally do? Yes 11; No 15;
More lenient 1.
6. Have there been any instances that you thought the jury
sentence was either too severe or to lenient? Yes 28, No 4.
C. Indeterminate Sentencing
1. Would you favor commitment of defendant to a professional
parole board at the penal institution to determine punishment
after examination by the board of defendant's character and
personal record? Yes 8; No 25.
2. Would you favor the fixing maximum sentence by judge and
leaving determination of minimum sentence to parole board?
Yes 9; No 25.
3. Would you favor the fixing of minimum sentence by judge and
leaving determination of maximum sentence to the parole board?
Yes 7; No 25.
II. INTEivmw wrm Mn. GLEN WADE AND MRs. LUCILE RoEBucK oF
THE KENTUCKY STATE PABoLE BoAPD, OcTOBER 18, 1968:
Wade: The Kentucky Parole Board is an independent agency of state
government attached to the Department of Corrections for admini-
1969] Nom
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strative purposes only. Responsible only to the Governor, members are
appointed in staggered terms for a term of four years, only to be
removed for cause. They visit each institution once a month to in-
terview inmates who are coming up for parole. The Legislature has
removed any minimum time required in prison and left such up to the
Parole Board. Incidentally, since that law was passed recidivism has
decreased. Last fiscal year only 40 parolees were convicted of a new
felony. This was out of a thousand under parole supervision.
Campbell: The Crime Commission has recommended sentencing by
judge. We have three alternatives-judge, jury, and indeterminate
sentencing. Would you favor a law providing that the Parole Board
would be given sole discretion as to the term of the convictee?
Wade: The recent law which gives the Parole Board the discretion to
set the minimum gives Kentucky the best system in the country.
Roebuck: The proposed law would give judges the responsibility of
setting the minimum and maximum. I would be opposed to judges
setting the minimum. Im opposed to any change in the law as it is
right now. We've presently the best law in the country. The Parole
Board has the discretion to let a person go whenever it deems him
ready. With the new law we reduced the old sentences rendered be-
fore the law minimum. We are doing this gradually. The law gives
wide latitude, including a kicker clause which deems that the Board
has authority to hear a case if three members out of five desire to hear
it at any time.
Campbell: One problem in allowing judge or jury sentencing is that
there will be a time when the judge sets the maximum and the Parole
Board finds that this is not long enough to rehabilitate the convictee
but its hands are tied. Wouldn't the Parole Board like to have the
power to extend a sentence and don't you think that the Parole Board
is better qualified to sentence than is a judge or jury?
Wade: That's a very searching question. I think it would deserve
further study.
Roebuck: I think that you will find, in that situation, that when the
court wants to give a man a sentence which is less than what the statute
required, it will reduce the charge down to something lower and I
don't think you would accomplish anything in that situation. You've
got to have local control over sentencing so that sentencing will be
done by someone who knows the defendant well.
Wade: You've got personality to consider.
Roebuck: Everybody by human nature likes to take care of their own
little baliwick and when you try to take sentencing away from local
authorties, i.e., judges, then you are going to create a bigger headache
than you realize. When you get right down to it, there is nothing
wrong with the community where crime was committed sentencing
the defendant.
I'm far more concerned with the repeaters. A man who commits one
offense right after another should be treated differently than one-
time offenders. We were at Eddyville Penitentiary this month and out
of 46 cases we heard, at least 15 had four or five convictions or more.
There should be a change for this type of person in order to keep
him there for longer than maximum time. Constant repeaters are our
biggest problem. The number of recidivists is extremely large.
Campbell: Who should set the maximum among the judge, jury, or
parole board?
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Wade: As of right now, the parole board is not asking for the power to
set the maxdmum.
Cunningham: Do you think there should be a statutory change in the
structure of the Parole Board, and qualification of its members?
Wade: No statutory reform is needed. It is efficient as it is now.
Roebuck: We are hardly in a position to say about that, but I think the
method whereby the Governors Committee on Corrections-a bipartisan
committee-made up of psychiatrists, the attorney general, labor leaders,
and others-is the best way to choose qualified members for the
Parole Board.
The rest of the interview can be summarized as follows:
It is the opinion of both Mr. Wade and Mrs. Roebuck that without
a diagnostic center and adequate staffing of such a center the Parole
Board did not want the duty of setting the maximum term which a man
could remain with them.
It was the opinion of both that the judge was the proper person to
determine the maximum sentence. Mrs. Roebuck emphasized the
disparity in sentencing among those who were guilty of the same
kind of offense. She felt that a jury was also more susceptible to a
sentence based upon emotion.
Mr. Wade emphasized that to be able to do a competent job in
determining the maximum sentence a person should serve, a diagnostic
center is essential. He stated that the cost of such a facility at the
present time was, as a practical matter, prohibitive.
In response to a question concerning facts considered when a
prisoner comes up for parole, Mr. Wade emphasized that such facts
as his social, economic, and family history are important as well as
his vocational abilities, and his attitude and record in prison.
Mr. Wade stated that there was not a full-time psychologist or
psychiatrist at either Eddyville or LaGrange. He stated that no psy-
chological or psychiatric report is made before those who have been
convicted of non-violent crimes are paroled. But he stated that when
an inmate has been convicted of a crime of violence, it is the general
practice of the Parole Board to have a report from a psychologist
before the prisoner is released. As for a psychiatric report, these are
nearly non-existent. The psychological data is obtained by individual
contracts with non-resident psychologists.
III. hn-rmvw wrrm Mn. STtmEE WnsmmBua G, ComxsSoNm or
CommarxoNS, AN MR. HAxoU_ BLAcK, D Trry Co nmnSSiom,
JANUAIRY 9, 1969.
Although Mr. Westerburg and Mr. Black would not oppose the
recommendation of sentencing by the Parole Board, they both ex-
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pressed the belief that the placing of such a responsibility on the
Board might create an unbearable burden because of lack of facilities
now available for sentencing. They opined that such a procedure
would be ideal if the Parole Board was provided with more members
so that it could be split into separate panels, higher salaries to attract
qualified personnel, and needed facilities for the sentencing function
such as presentence reporting and/or diagnostic centers. Mr. Wester-
burg estimated that such a indeterminate procedure would require a
maximum security center of 125 beds at $20,000 per bed. As to what
should be done now, under our present system, both suggested that
judge sentencing would be the next best thing to a well-equipped pro-
fessional sentencing board. They were strongly in favor of presentence
reports and any other means of educating the judge as to the pro-
pensities and character of the defendant.
IV. Lm' mx FR o D PTY CoMmissioNE oF CommcrioNs,
MR. H~noLD BLAcK:
This is in reply to your request for information concerning the per-
centage of prisoners paroled and released by expiration of sentence from
our male institutions during their last several years. An examination of our
records for the last six year period, determined on a fiscal year basis at
the Penitentiary and a calendar year basis at the Reformatory, reveals
the following percentages:
Discharged by
Institution Discharged by Parole Expiration
Kentucky State Penitentiary 46.22% 53.58%
(Fiscal years 1962-63 through
1968-69)
Kentucky State Reformatory
(Calendar Year 1963-68) 50.36% 49.64%
In addition, you wished to know what percentage of inmates are
committed to serve the maximum sentence prescribed by the statutes
for their respective crimes. We have examined the records of 1213
persons who are serving sentences on less than the allowable maximum
term prescribed by the statute covering their specific offense, and 13%
are serving the maximum terms. Due to your request that the informa-
tion be provided as rapidly as possible, we did not have an opportunity
to adequately review those sentences against persons and hope that this
information will be satisfactory for your purposes.
[Vol. 57,
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